Abstract: In this paper, a time-inconsistent stochastic linear-quadratic problem is investigated under the philosophy of self-control to balance the global optimality and time consistency. To this aim, the controller is modelled as having two classes of selves: precommitted self and sophisticated self whose objective functionals are obtained through modifying the cost functional of the linear-quadratic problem. Concerned with the best-response policies, the precommitted self adheres to looking for an optimal policy that minimize a lifetime objective functional, and at the same time the sophisticated selves would like to select a time-consistent policy via a intertemporal game. The obtained equilibrium of sophisticated selves is called an open-loop self-coordination equilibrium control of the original linear-quadratic problem. Furthermore, this study of open-loop self-coordination equilibrium control is sublimed to a more general time-inconsistent nonzero-sum stochastic linear-quadratic game, for which one player is to find the precommitted policy and the other player is to find the time-consistent policy.
Introduction

Time inconsistency and Strotz's framework
Dynamic programming is a fundamental and powerful approach to solving optimal control problems; the basic idea is to consider a family of problems with different initial times and states, and to establish relationships among these problems. Bellman's principle of optimality is the core of this approach which states using Bellman's words [5] as "An optimal policy has the property that whatever the initial state and initial decision are, the remaining decisions must constitute an optimal policy with regard to the state resulting from the first decision." This property is termed as the time consistency of optimal control. However, recent progresses in mean-field optimal control open the door for us to time inconsistency, in which case the time consistency of optimal control will no longer hold.
Problems with nonlinear terms of conditional expectation (in the objective functional) are classified as mean-field stochastic optimal controls, which have gained considerable attention during the last few years [25, 39] . As there is no nonlinear version of the tower property of conditional expectation, the controller at different time instants is facing with different objective, which are not consistent with the global objectives. Therefore, the time inconsistency comes from the conflicts between long-term (global) optimal control on the lifetime horizon and short-term (local) optimal control on the tail time horizon.
In fact, the time inconsistency has been investigated as early as in 1955 for optimal consumption planning problem [31] ; it is hypothesized [31] that people are born with tendency to overvalue current consumption and that more discounting occurs between the present and the near future than between periods in the more distant future, namely, the discounting function in the objective functional is nonexponential. Here, it is the non-exponential discounting that brings conflicts and time inconsistency between the global and local optimal solutions. Though exponential discounting is of great importance to model people's time preference [30] , empirical researches over the last half century have documented the inadequacy of constant discount rate. Among others, hyperbolic discounting is a known anomaly and is often used to describe the case with a declining discount rate [13] .
The aforementioned two factors that ruin the time consistency reflect people's risk preferences and time preference in some nontraditional ways, both of which are of the phenomenon of "changing tastes" in intertemporal choices [4] , namely, today's preference conflicts with tomorrow's preference. To handle the time inconsistency, there are several different approaches in existing literature and a rule of selecting the preferred solution is called as a choice mechanism [4] . The first one is the precommitment choice for which the initial policy is implemented on the lifetime horizon. This approach neglects the time inconsistency, and the optimal policy is optimal only when viewed at the initial time. The second mechanism is naive choice or myopic choice: at each time instant a naive agent embarks on the option that currently seems best, namely, this agent sticks to the local objective and completely ignores the global interest. However, the naive policy makes no sense of optimality, and simple example [4] shows that it might be the worst one of all the policies viewed from the initial time instant.
Another mechanism is sophisticated choice proposed by Strotz [31] . In the viewpoint of Strotz, the decision maker at different time instants is regarded as different selves, and the time inconsistency suggests a conflict between different these selves. At any time instant the current self takes account of future selves' decisions, and the equilibrium of this intertemporal game is called a sophisticated policy, which is time-consistent. Inspired by Strotz's idea, hundreds of works have sought to tackle practical problems in economics and finance; see, for example, [8, 9, 11, 12, 16, 20, 21, 24, 28] and the references therein. Moreover, accompanying the appearance of time-inconsistent mean-field optimal control, recent years have witnessed the rapid progresses of extending Strotz's idea in the theoretical control community; see, for example, [7, 18, 19, 23, 25, 29, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39] . So far, the sophisticated policy and precommitted policy are two extreme solutions; namely, the sophisticated policy recovers the time consistency and ignores the global optimality, while the precomitted solution does not care about the time consistency and just pays attention to the global optimality on the lifetime horizon. Therefore, new notion and new philosophy that are beyond the sophisticated policy and precommitted policy should be developed to strike a balance between the global optimality and time consistency.
Self-control of Thaler and Shefrin
The "selves" in Strotz's formulation have the attribute of time, which file out with the time. Differently and to handle the time inconsistency, the economists Thaler and Shefrin [32] introduce a two-dimensional self-control model: the individual at any instant in time is assumed to be both a farsighted planner and a myopic doer. This division into conflicting subselves is how psychologists think about self-control, and the notion of self-control is paradoxical without it. The doer at each moment in time exists only for one period and is completely selfish, or myopic [32] , namely, the objective of each doer is independent of past and future variables that are concerned. On the contrary, the planner is concerned with the lifetime objective, which is derived from the objectives of all the doers. Interestingly, pointed out by [32] and due to the myopic nature of the doers, the conflict between the planner and doers is fundamentally similar to the agency relationship between the employer/principal and employees/agents of a firm. In fact, this two-self model to understand the savings behavior of individuals and households is one of four Thaler's contributions in behavioral economics to win 2017 Nobel Prize [1] . For the recent progresses on two-self formulation, we are referred to [6, 10, 14, 15, 17, 27] and references therein.
Actually, the idea of two-self model can be traced back to the work of Adam Smith [2] in 1759; and [32] is the first systematic and formal treatment of a two-self economic man, which integrates economics with psychology. A key feature of this planner-doer modelling is that the planner is also allowed to bear some influence on doers' behavior. For this, the doers are given the discretion to either modify their preferences or alter the incentives (rewards, punishments, etc). Specifically, through incorporating the costly control of a "preference modification parameter" (selected by the planner) into the doers' utilities, the behaviors of the planner and doers can be mutually influenced, and the planner's utility is simultaneously modified. By finding the equilibrium of this intrapersonal game, a balance between the lifetime objective and myopic objectives is achieved. Noting that the planner does not actually consume, the policy of this game selected by the doers is the one that is executed by the individual.
Problem formulation of this paper
Problem (LQ)
We in this paper combine Strotz's and Thaler-Shefrin's methodologies to handle the time inconsistency of a stochastic linear-quadratic (LQ, for short) problem and to strike a balance between the global optimality and time consistency. Specifically, introduce the LQ problem with the system dynamics given by the controlled stochastic difference equation (S∆E, for short)
where
k ∈ R n×m are deterministic matrices; {X k , k ∈ T t } X and {u k , k ∈ T t } u with T t = {t, ..., N } are the state process and control process, respectively. The noise {w k , k ∈ T} is assumed to be a vector-valued martingale difference sequence defined on a probability space (Ω, F, P) with
2) is the conditional mathematical expectation E[ · |F k ] with respect to F k = σ{w l , l = 0, 1, · · · , k − 1}, and F 0 is understood as {∅, Ω}. In (1.1), x belongs to l 2 F (t; R n ), which is defined as
The objective functional is
t are deterministic symmetric matrices of appropriate dimensions. Let
Then, the LQ problem is stated as follows.
Problem (LQ). Letting t ∈ T and x
Problem (LQ) is time-inconsistent as the objective functional (1.3) contains nonlinear terms of conditional expectation and the weighting matrices of (1.3) depend on the initial time. u * of (1.4) is called a precommitted optimal control for the initial pair (t, x), which totally adheres to the global interest on the lifetime horizon T t . Noting that u * neglects the time inconsistency, the following notion yet pays attention to the time-consistent solution of Problem (LQ), which is firstly introduced by Strotz [31] with the name of sophisticated policy.
is called a sophisticated/time-consistent equilibrium control of Problem (LQ) for the initial pair (t, x), if for any k ∈ T t and any
Here, u c | T k and u c | T k+1 are the restrictions of u c on T k and T k+1 , respectively; and X c k is given by
The sophisticated policy and precommitted policy are two extreme and irreconcilable solutions for time-inconsistent optimal control; namely, the sophisticated policy recovers the time consistency and ignores the global optimality, while the precomitted solution does not care about the time consistency and just pays attention to the global optimality on the lifetime horizon. To strike a balance between the global optimality and time consistency, we in this section combine Strotz's and Thaler-Shefrin's methodologies [31, 32] to handle time inconsistency.
Specifically, with the philosophy of self-control, the controller/decision-maker of Problem (LQ) is modelled as having two classes of selves: precommitted self and sophisticated selves. The precommitted self adheres to looking for an optimal control that minimizes its lifetime objective functional, and all the sophisticated selves together would like to select a time-consistent policy via a intertempral game. Similarly to [32] , we pose the following constraints which are in essence part of our model:
1 The precommitted self does not actually implement its policy to the controlled system, but rather derives utility from those of the sophisticated selves;
2 The precommitted self requires some psychic techniques capable of affecting the sophisticated selves' behaviors, and the sophisticated selves are given discretion to either modify their preferences or alter the incentives (rewards, punishments, etc).
Following the two points, the objective functionals of the precommitted self and period-k sophisticated self, k ∈ T t are obtained by modifying (1.3):
Here, Ψ k ∈ R m×m are symmetric and µ k ∈ R, k ∈ T t . The inner states in J(t, x; u, v) and J(k,x; u| T k , v| T k ) are given by 8) and
(1.9)
The coupling terms
of (1.6) (1.7) reflect the philosophy of "commitment by punishment". Specifically, for a control u that the precommitted self selects, at any time instant k ∈ T t , any deviation of period-k sophisticated self's control v k from u k will be punished by adding a term
At the same time, the total punishment
will be added to J(t, x; u) to penalize the precommitted self; this is the idea of Point 1 above. Furthermore, different from the myopic objectives of the doers [32] , the objectives of sophisticated selves are nonmyopic.
Due to the terms
, there is a game between the precommitted self u and sophisticated selves {v k , k ∈ T t }. As the policy of the precommitted self is not actually executed, we have the following type of equilibrium solution of Problem (LQ).
(1.12)
Modifying the cost functional to obtain (1.6) (1.7) is also motivated by [10] , which is the first to study the nonmyopic local objectives under the framework of planner-doer game and also is the first to propose the terminology of self-coordination policy. By applying suitable penalty functions to the global and local objectives, [10] develops an axiom scheme to ensure some internal harmony of the global and local interests of this leader-follower game framework with self-coordination. The planner-doer model is essentially a leader-follower formulation, where the planner and doers have hierarchical status [10] [32] . Different from the formulation of [10] , this paper introduces a precommitted self and many sophisticated selves to strike a balance between the global optimality and time consistency. Except for some specific requirements, it is natural to place the two class of selves under equal status. So, in Definition 1.2, we derive u * and v * simultaneously. It needs further to emphasize that the self-coordination equilibrium solution of this paper is of open loop. In contrast, the self-coordination policy of [10] is closed-loop; see (9) and Theorem 3.1 of [10] . Moreover, a general time-inconsistent nonzero-sum stochastic LQ game is introduced (in next section), which sublimes the study of open-loop self-coordination equilibrium control of the considered LQ problem to a more general situation.
Problem (GLQ)
From (1.8) and (1.9) and letting
(1.13)
Hence, (1.6) (1.7) are expressed as
To sublime the study of open-loop self-coordination equilibrium control of Problem (LQ) to a more general situation, we introduce a general nonzero-sum stochastic LQ game, Problem (GLQ). One player of this nonzero-sum LQ game is to find the precommitted policy and the other player is to find the time-consistent policy. Specifically, consider a system 16) and the cost functionals
k ∈ R n×m2 of (1.16) and the weighting matrices in (1.17) (1.18) are deterministic matrices; and Problem (GLQ). For the initial pair (t, y), find a pair (u
( 
Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 give the problem formulation and main results. The proofs of main results are given in Section 4. Section 3 studies the mean-variance portfolio selection, and some concluding remarks are given in Section 5.
Main results
This section presents the main results of the paper, whose proofs are given in Section 4. ii) There exists a (u
1)
and the convex conditions
k+1 are computed via the backward difference equations (BS∆Es, for short)
and
with {α k , k ∈ T t }, {β ℓ , ℓ ∈ T k } given by the S∆Es
is an open-loop equilibrium of Problem (GLQ).
To characterize the stationary conditions (2.1), introduce the Riccati-like equations:
Furthermore, the following Riccati-like equations
and the linear equations
are to characterize the convex condition (2.2) with
Throughout the paper, Ran(Φ) and Ker(Φ) denote the range and kernel of matrix Φ, respectively. ii) The following assertions hold.
a) The conditions
are satisfied, where
b) The solutions of (2.14) (2.15) have the property
are satisfied, where α u is given by
Under any of i) and ii), the open-loop equilibrium of Problem (GLQ) can be selected as (2.20) .
If all the weighting matrices of (1.17) (1.18) do not depend on the initial times, this corresponds to a special case of Problem (GLQ), which is denoted as Problem (sGLQ) below. For Problem (sGLQ), the corresponding .9) (2.10) (2.14) (2.15) are also independent of the initial times, and are denoted respectively by
Furthermore, matrices in (2.11) (2.12) (2.13) (2.16) (2.19) do not depend on the initial times too. For example, (2.10) (2.12) become to
The following result is direct by Theorem 2.2.
are satisfied, then for any initial pair (t, y) × R n , Problem (GLQ) admits an open-loop equilibrium that is given in (2.20).
Now consider Problem (LQ)
. Using the notations of (1.17) (1.18), the weighting matrices of (1.14) (1.15) can been written as
Combining (1.14) and (1.15), we can get results that are parallel to Theorem 2.2 and Theorem 2.3 to characterize the open-loop self-coordination equilibrium control of Problem (LQ).
An example
In this section, we find the open-loop self-coordination equilibrium of multi-period mean-variance portfolio selection, which is a special example of Problem (LQ). Consider a capital market consisting of one riskless asset and m risky assets over a finite time horizon N . Let s k (> 1) be a given deterministic return of the riskless asset at time period k and e k = (e
T the vector of random returns of the m risky assets at period k. We assume that vectors e k , k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1, are statistically independent and the only information known about the random return vector e k is its first two moments: its mean E(e k ) = (Ee
Clearly, Cov(e k ) is nonnegative definite, i.e., Cov(e k ) ≥ 0.
Let X k ∈ R be the wealth of the investor at the beginning of the k-th period, and let u i k be the amount invested in the i-th risky asset at period
k is the amount invested in the riskless asset at period k, and the wealth at the beginning of the (k + 1)-th period [22] is given by
where Θ k is the excess return vector of risky assets [22] 
T . In this section, we consider the case where short-selling of stocks is allowed, i.e., u i k , i = 1, ..., k, can be taken values in R. This leads to a multi-period mean-variance portfolio selection formulation. For this problem, we let
To find the self-coordination equilibrium of Problem (MV), we shall transform (3.1) into a linear controlled system with multiplicative noises so that the general theory of above section can work. Precisely,
where the i-th entry of
T , k ∈ T} is a martingale difference sequence as e k , k = 0, .., N − 1, are statistically independent. Furthermore,
and (3.1) becomes to
Then, a time-inconsistent version of multi-period mean-variance problem [22] can be formulated as follows.
Problem (MV). For t ∈ T and z
Here,
with λ > 0 the trade-off parameter between the mean and the variance of the terminal wealth.
To find the open-loop self-coordination equilibrium of Problem (MV) and similarly to (1.14) (1.15), we introduce the following objective functionals:
and X a is similarly defined as that of (1.13) with initial state X a t = (z z) T and the system parameters
Due to {Υ k , k ∈ T t }, (3.5) (3.6) are a little more general than those of (1.14) (1.15).
Theorem 3.1. Given {Υ k , k ∈ T}, let the condition
be satisfied, where
with G 1 , G 2 and the system parameters
k+1 is the (i, j)-th entry of P k+1 and T k+1 , respectively. Then, for any (t, z) ∈ T × R, Problem (MV) admits an open-loop self-coordination equilibrium control v * for the initial pair (t, z) and {Υ k , k ∈ T t }, which can be selected via
Then for any initial pair Problem (MV) admits an open-loop self-coordination equilibrium control.
Note that Cov(Θ k ) > 0, k ∈ T is a common assumption in multi-period mean-variance portfolio selection [8] [10] [22] . Furthermore, the proofs of Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 are given in Section 4.
Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2.1
The proof is based on the method of discrete-time convex variation.
From (1.19) and (4.1), we have
Noting (2.3) and (2.7), we have
Then, (4.2) becomes to
As (4.3) holds for any ε ∈ R and any u ∈ l 2 F (T t , R m1 ), we must have
which implies the first equation of (2.1).
On the other hand, for any λ ∈ R and 19) and (4.4) , we have
From (2.4) and (2.8), we have
Hence, (4.5) becomes to
which holds for any λ ∈ R and any
and the second equation of (2.1) holds. ii)⇒i). By reversing the proof of i)⇒ii), we can obtain the conclusion.
Proof of Theorem 2.2
Proposition 4.1. The following statements are equivalent. i). There exists a (u
ii). a) of Theorem 2.2 is satisfied. Under the condition ii), the backward states Y * , Z k, * of (2.3) and (2.4) have the following expressions
Let us first consider the case k = N − 1. We have
Then, the first equations of (4.7)and (4.8) become to 0 = S 1(1) 
Furthermore,
Therefore, the second equations of (4.7) and (4.8) become to 
With the notations of (2.11) (2.12), we have from above equations
Therefore, by a property of Moore-Penrose inverse (Lemma 3.1 of [3] ), (2.17) (2.18) hold for k = N − 1 and we can select
For k = N − 2 and by mimic the derivations between (4.9) and (4.11), we have
Therefore, (2.17) (2.18) hold for k = N − 2 and we can select
Hence, Hence, (2.20)
By repeating the above procedure, we can get the expressions of the backward states Y * , Z k, * and u * , v * .
ii)⇒i). Due to the property of Moore-Penrose inverse and by reversing the proof of i)⇒ii), we can obtain the conclusion.
We now study the convex condition (2.2). By adding to and subtracting
Similarly,
As O t,k , O t,k are symmetric, there exit orthogonal matrices F t,k , F t,k such that
In the above, Σ t,k , Γ t,k , are diagonal matrices, whose diagonal elements are the nonzero eigenvalues of
Moreover, F t,k , F t,k can be decomposed as
spectively, where the lines of F
t,k , F
t,k form the bases of Ker(O t,k ) and Ker(O t,k ), respectively. Let
Hence, we have
(4.14)
Note that the space spanned by lines of F
Proposition 4.2. The following statements are equivalent.
i) There exists a (u
ii) b) and c) of Theorem 2.2 are satisfied.
we have E t α k = 0, k ∈ T t , and
Introduce a set
We now prove that τ is a surjection. In fact, for any θ ∈ U 1 (Ran), we have E t θ k = 0, k ∈ T t and let
, from (4.16) we have
Hence, τ is a surjection defined from U 1 (Ran) to U 1 (Ran). From this, (4.15) and the procedure of contradiction, we have
Note further that u → J 1 (t, 0; u) is convex. If u ∈ U 2 (Ran), from (4.14) we have
k denote the lines of F (1) t,k . For any u ∈ U 2 (Ran) and k ∈ T t , there exit
is a deterministic space. Furthermore, introduce a bounded linear operator φ from U 2 (Ran) to U 2 (Ran):
We now prove that φ is a surjection. In fact, for any ς ∈ U 2 (Ran), let
, from (4.18) we have
Hence φ is a surjection defined from U 2 (Ran) to U 2 (Ran). From this, (4.17) and the procedure of contradiction, we have Γ t,k > 0, k ∈ T t . This further implies O t,k ≥ 0, k ∈ T t . Furthermore, from (4.13), it is easy to get O k,k ≥ 0, k ∈ T t .
We now prove c) of Theorem 2.2. Note that
Then,
In the above, we must have
Otherwise, assume there exist k 1 ∈ T t and u such that
with Λ 1 ∈ F k1 and its probability P(
which is impossible. Hence, there exists Λ ∈ F t with P(Λ) > 0 such that
(w)
(ω)
with I {·} (ω) be the indicator function. Then, under (4.21) and for ω ∈ Λ, we have
As P(Λ) > 0, (4.22) 
Then, we need only to show
In fact, for any η ∈ l 2 F (T t ; R m1 ), let
Thus η u = η. Hence, (4.23) holds, which together with
This completes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 3.1
Due to (1.11) of Definition 1.2, (3.6) can be equivalently replaced bȳ
Applying the general theory of Section 2 to Problem (MV), (2.9)-(2.13) becomes to 26) and
k . Here, the system matrices are given in (3.9). Noting P N = T N = T N = 0, simple calculations show the properties:
N −1 , which implies the form of P k :
Hence, we have (3.12) and (3.11). Furthermore, for Problem (MV) and under the parameters (3.7)-(3.9), (2.14)-(2.16) becomes to
Introduce a new optimal control problem with the system dynamics 32) and the objective functional
that is to be minimized within l 2 F (T t ; R m1 ). Here, the parameters in (4.32)-(4.33) are from (3.7)-(3.9), and w i k , i = 1, ..., m, k ∈ T, are given in (3.2). Clearly, this is a special example of the static mean-field LQ optimal control problem that is considered in [26] . As L (1)
we have from Theorem 4.3 of [26] that
This completes the proof by following Theorem 2.2 and using the notations of (3.11)-(3.12). 34) and for given ζ 0 ∈ Ξ k select Υ k such that
Proof of Theorem 3.2
Note that (3.10) is equivalent to
and that
holds for given c ∈ R. By some calculations, the determinant of coefficient matrix of (4.36) is
(4.37)
If c = 0 or P (11) k+1 = 0, x 1 and x 2 of (4.36) can be both selected to be 0. For c = 0 and P (11) k+1 = 0, we have the following three cases. 
(4.38) 
Therefore, by selecting Υ k , k ∈ T t with (4.35) we can have Ran(H k ) ⊂ Ran(W k ), k ∈ T and similarly h k ∈ Ran( W k ), k ∈ T can be proved. This completes the proof.
Conclusion
The paper deals with a time-inconsistent nonzero-sum stochastic LQ dynamic game, for which one player is to find the precommitted policy and the other player is to find the time-consistent policy. This is motivated by finding the open-loop self-coordination equilibrium control of a time-inconsistent stochastic LQ problem, where the controller is modelled as having two classes of selves: precommitted self and sophisticated self. Necessary and sufficient conditions are derived to characterize the open-loop equilibrium of the nonzero-sum stochastic LQ dynamic game via Riccati-like equations, and as byproduct, result to ensure the existence of open-loop self-coordination equilibrium control is also obtained. To test the general theory, the mean-variance portfolio selection is investigated. For future research, the closedloop self-coordination equilibrium should be should be investigated.
A Supplementary material
In this section, we will give two examples to validate the efficiency of the developed theory.
A.1 Example 1
Consider a discrete-time stochastic LQ problem, whose system dynamics and cost functional are given, respectively, by 
and {w k , k = 0, 1, 2, 3} is a martingale difference with constant second-order conditional moment
and introduce equations similar to (1.14) (1.15) with µ k = 1, Ψ k = 1, k ∈ T t . To find the self-coordination equilibrium control of this LQ problem, we resort to the general theory of Section 2; in this case, we have To validate Remark 1.3, we let µ k → ∞, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} and check the difference between the gains of
Fix Ψ k = 1, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, and let µ k , k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} all be equal to µ. Then, So, for this example, when µ approaches the infinity, the difference of gain of v k , u k , k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} will approach zero. Furthermore and most importantly, when µ approaches the infinity, the gains of v * k , u * k , k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} do not explode!
A.2 Example 2
Consider a multi-period mean-variance portfolio selection problem. A capital market consists of one riskless asset and three risky assets over a finite time horizon N = 4, and the parameters of the model are as follows x = 10, s k = 1.04, Ee Furthermore, P k , T k , k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} of (3.12) are Similarly to Example 1, when µ approaches the infinity, the difference of gain of v k , u k , k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} will approach zero.
